# Neg---Counterplans

## CP Theory

### Debating Russia Good

#### Debating about Russia as an actor creates more critical thinking and solves interpersonal violence

Earle 86 [Professor of Psychology, The Ohio State University. International Relations and the Psychology of Control: Alternative Control Strategies and Their Consequences. Political Psychology, Vol. 7, No. 2 (Jun.,1986), pp. 369-375. https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/3791131.pdf]

Research into the psychology of control has revealed that control needs are key elements of individual psychological functioning. This paper argues that a “need for control’’ framework is also useful for understanding actions and ideologies at the national and international levels. It critically analyzes prevalent strategies for exerting control in this domain and proposes alternative strategies which permit greater fulfillment of control needs. These alternatives emerge from an examination of potential similarities between satisfaction of control needs within the separate but parallel domains of international relations and interpersonal relations.

Political psychology has the potential to translate issues of international relations into the terms of human interpersonal encounter. In my view, such a translation enhances our ability to think creatively about the current world situation.

The students in my freshman psychology course recently surprised me by adopting this approach for an in-class assignment. I had asked them to role-play a negotiating session between the United States and the Soviet Union on the issue of arms control. My assumption had been that they would act out the roles of political leaders on both sides, and would proceed by exchanging official positions on arms control issues. Instead, they took the viewpoint of ordinary Ameri-can and Soviet citizens and exchanged candid remarks concerning their feelings about the nuclear danger.

Their tone of earnest sincerity was in stark contrast to the kind of elaborate posturing, deceitfulness, and strategic “positioning” that usually characterizes this kind of endeavor at the diplomatic level. Having translated the arms race into its smallest constituent parts—the feelings of individual Soviet and American citizens—they had stripped away the layers of pretense and revealed the rigidly arbitrary nature of their country’s “party line.” After the role-play had ended, the students pressed me to admit that, if the political and military leaders on both sides were removed from the picture, much of the current conflict between the two countries could be settled by a consensus of common citizens from both sides.

It only occurred to me later that, regardless of the practicality of their solution, my class had arrived at it by a highly unusual means: They had asserted that the problems were amenable to human control by acknowledging their own individual human reactions to the dangers of continued international confrontation. I choose to focus here not on the solution my students proposed but on the impulse behind their proposal. The need expressed by these students to render these issues “controllable” in some fashion is a basic one. Perhaps an examination of this need, and the more vs. less healthy ways it can be satisfied, holds the key to a novel approach to international relations.

The concept of a “need for control” has recently received much attention within the field of psychology. The belief that one can exercise control over one’s outcomes is said to be critical to psychological well-being (Glass and Singer, 1972; Langer, 1983; Seligman, 1975; Wortman and Brehm, 1975). Research has shown that the negative consequences of a stressful event on physical and mental health can be overcome by a sense of control—i.e., a belief in one’s ability to cope with (respond effectively to) the event (Anderson, 1982; Langer and Rodin, 1976; Perlmuter and Monty, 1979; Weiss, 1972). The accumulating body of research in this area has promising applications for the restoration and maintenance of psychological health in a wide range of human environmental settings.

To date, feelings of control have been studied as an attribute of individual psychological functioning. However, the recent work of Fred Rothbaum and John Weisz and their colleagues (Rothbaum et al., 1982; Weisz et al., 1984) suggests that a “need for control” analysis may also be useful for understanding the functioning of individual nations within the international arena. Rothbaum et al. distinguish between primary and secondary forms of control. Primary control is the ability to enhance one’s rewards by doing something to influence existing realities (e.g., other people, circumstances). In secondary control, rewards are obtained by accommodating to existing realities and maximizing satisfaction with things as they are.

In other words, people attempt to gain control not only by bringing the environment into line with their wishes (primary control) but also by bringing themselves into line with environmental forces (secondary control). Weisz et al. argue that cultures differ in the extent to which they emphasize primary vs. secondary forms of control. They conclude that the proper relation between the two forms of control involves a dynamic interplay between them, and warn that too heavy an emphasis on either primary or secondary control may be maladaptive for cultures as well as individuals.

Extending the logic of Weisz et al. to the realm of international relations, it can be assumed that citizens and policymakers alike define the requirements of national self-interest in somewhat the same terms they use to evaluate their own individual sense of well-being. For example, there is widespread agreement that a key element of a “healthy” American psyche is a sense of national potency (“primary control,” in our terms) in the international arena. Ronald Reagan’s Presidency has been lauded by both supporters and detractors for its “restoration” of this sense of control after the “humiliating” decade of the 1970s—a legacy of Vietnam, the oil embargo, and the Iranian hostage crisis (cf. Yankelovich, 1982). Whether or not such a felt sense of control (or lack of same) would be sustained by an objective appraisal, it is nonetheless real if it has real consequences for domestic political priorities and foreign policy actions.

Given the present context of international relations, is an enhanced sense of control by one nation purchased at the expense of diminished control by other nations? [The Weisz et al. analysis does not attempt to address this key issue.] Under what conditions can this zero-sum notion of control be overcome? If the attainment of a sense of control is indeed an important objective within the world community, then these questions are critical.

The answer may lie in exploring alternative strategies for attaining primary control. For example, the prevailing strategy requires nations to maximize their power vis a vis potential adversaries. Yet the sense of control thus attained is always tenuous, because (a) the technological basis for maintaining such relative power may be eclipsed by breakthroughs on the other side, (b) such technology is subject to dissemination to third parties, thus diluting the power of its former owners, and (c) power that involves the domination of one nation by another (either directly or through surrogates) is bound to be resisted by those subject peoples whose own needs for control have been thwarted. Numerous examples attest to the existence of these needs (under the guise of “nationalism” and “self-determination” or “revolution” and “rebellion”—depending on the orientation of the describer) as a continued source of frustration for the great powers in their attempts to maintain the stability of client states.

Faced with these difficulties of asserting primary control, both the United States and the Soviet Union have come to rely heavily on a form of secondary control that Weisz et al. refer to as interpretive control. This is the attempt to interpret events so as to derive a sense of meaning and purpose from them. In the current great power struggle, this assumes the form of rigidly ideological beliefs about the nature of the “other side’’ and the necessity of continued struggle. It allows individual persons and actions to be subsumed under a “grand scheme” of impersonal global forces (e.g., “good” vs. “evil”). The interpretive route to control works to the extent that it provides a reassuring sense of order and predictability. However, this unifying vision is purchased at the expense of an empirically based analysis of what the rest of the world is doing and why. Reality is distorted to fit the dichotomy of rightness (on one’s own behalf) vs. transgression.

The selective “management” of information about foreign policy successes vs. failures is essential to this enterprise [the U.S. invasion of Grenada provides a recent example; see e.g., Middleton (1984) and Nelson (1983)]. Unfortunately, such selective information-gathering seriously impairs foreign policy. Numerous authors have described occasions on which great powers have become the captives of their own over-simplified world views (e.g., Didion, 1983; Tuchman, 1984; Sick, 1985).

Extended use of this secondary control strategy requires a blurring of the distinction between international politics and fiction. The Soviet Union does not enjoy a monopoly in this regard. Within the last year, the Vietnam War veteran has been resurrected as an American hero, and American audiences have eagerly imbibed his cinematic revenge against the North Vietnamese in “Rambo,” “Missing in Action,” and their television counterparts.

A related phenomenon is the president’s identification with the on-screen personas of fellow actors Clint Eastwood and Sylvester Stallone, whose adherence to simplified credos belie the gnawing complexities of value choices in the real world. Such reactions are likely not unique to Americans or to their current president. Instead, they are symptomatic of the frustrations incurred by nations who have failed in their attempts to exert active control over world events.

The control needs themselves are legitimate; the strategies that are currently employed for satisfying those needs are not. Use of such measures guarantees that the cycle will repeat itself—i.e., that unrealistic thinking and erroneous judgment will serve as the basis for future foreign policy actions.

The question remains: If the nations of the world cannot afford continued reliance on such an ineffective (and unbalanced) “mix” of control strategies, what are the alternatives? As suggested above, the answer lies in exploring alternative conceptions of “control.” Rather than conceiving of control as a subject-object relationship, in which the “object” is a fixed quantity (of land, resources, subject populations) to be apportioned among contending powers, one could instead consider it in the context of a subject-subject relationship, a dy-namic system in which control needs are realized by the exercise of mutual influence.

An analogy between the realms of international relations and interpersonal relations may serve to illustrate this distinction. In a personal relationship that is subject-object-based, each party has a mutually exclusive sphere of self-interest (“turf”) to be protected; the relationship must be negotiated on the basis of how much turf each party will cede to the other in exchange for similar consideration. A failure of negotiation may lead to unilateral attempts by either/both parties to grab some of the other’s turf. “Compromise” and “confrontation” thus define the parameters of this type of relationship.

Alternatively, a personal relationship may be subject-subject-based, to the extent that the relationship is not primarily directed toward the issue of sharing vs. hoarding (of a separate domain of self-interest) but rather toward a redefinition of self and self-interest in terms of the relationship. Satisfaction in such a relationship is not derived from the amount of turf seized from, or conceded by, the other party. Instead it obtains from the opportunity to exert positive influence over the other’s outcomes, and in turn to be the beneficiary of the other’s positive consideration and favorable regard (cf. Kelley, 1979; Kelley and Thi-baut, 1978).

#### Ethnocentrism—scholars that isolate the US role are suspect

McFaul 9 (Michael, Democracy Badass @ Stanford, http://iis-db.stanford.edu/res/2278/Evaluating\_International\_Influences\_-\_Transitions\_-\_Concept\_Paper.pdf)

A second shortcoming stems from the fact that the existing analyses on international democracy promotion focuses on the democracy promotion efforts (the “supply side”) of individual countries, notably the United States. 15 In reality, it is never the case that the United States alone - or any other external actor for that matter - plays an independent causal role in the development of democratization in another country. The unique American contribution to democratic development in a given country can only be isolated if all other external variables are included in the analysis. There was a time when the United States government was the only major actor in the world promoting democracy, but that time has passed. As noted above, today, the European Union, individual European governments and their democracy-promoting foundations and NGOs, the United Nations, NATO, the World Bank, and hundreds if not thousands of transnational networks and private foundations also contribute to the democracy promotion business. Simply focusing on the American contribution to a case of democratization (or the lack thereof) is methodologically suspect and therefore empirically flawed. There is some analysis on the role of Western European governments and supranational European institutions (particularly the European Union) in promoting democracy abroad, 16 but American and European insights are rarely integrated, and few studies are prepared to look at a range of international actors and processes. 17 Consequently there has been little systematic thinking about the spectrum of forces shaping the international “democratic environment,” not to mention the interaction of the external environment with domestic processes.

#### Develops critical thinking and checks ethnocentrism -- net benefit alone fails

Hulme 11 – Ph.D. Candidate (Michael, March 23, “Education for Global Citizenship in America”, http://libres.uncg.edu/ir/uncg/f/Hulme\_uncg\_0154D\_10611.pdf)

The richness and diversity of sources reinforces the need for their critical evaluation. This is more than understanding that all „data‟ are more or less partial, in the senses of being both biased and incomplete: a compounding factor is the extent to which interpretation may be influenced, possibly unintentionally, by the mediating influence of one‟s own (possibly ethnocentric, certainly partial) view of the world. Even where ethnocentrism is not a factor, interactions with others might nevertheless be perceived as ethnocentric, especially in the minds of those whose understanding of the US and Americans have already been adversely prejudiced, in the same way as some Americans have internalized prejudices against others. This points to a greater need to develop the willingness to try to see the world **through the eyes of others** – and conversely to help others to see the world through American eyes (though without imparting any sense of superiority). Developing this skill, and generally developing awareness and understanding of others‟ perspectives, might additionally inform students‟ perceptions of bias in domestic media, domestic political representations, and other domestic sources. It should also provide insights into the extent to which media channels reinforce the prejudices of their respective audiences, no matter how ‘false’ those prejudices might be, effectively stifling critical thinking.

An example of a particular lesson here is to compare and deconstruct the various stories presented about a particular event or phenomenon in another country, whether contemporary or historical. These various presentations might include historical records, news media coverage, „official‟ statements, and stories shared by individuals with whom relationships have been established on the one hand, and the domestic equivalents on the other.87 Comparisons of this sort may well provide significant insights into how others (even those essentially friendly to the US) view the US and Americans, and why they do so. This in turn might lead to some understanding of others‟ behavior, which would otherwise remain opaque. Some of the findings set out in Chapter IV constitute cases in point, two example being on the one side you say we want to assist you, but on the other side you are pointing fingers at us. So which way do you want to be, a devil or an angel?

I think you have a lot of interest shown by the Western world to make an establishment, to establish their force in the military alliance but they aren't really responsible, ensuring responsibility in ensuring that it is used for the right purposes.88

The lessons implicit in this form of investigation should lead to a more critical evaluation of the myths of superiority and salvific mission which form the focus of this Dissertation, and facilitate President Kennedy‟s 1962 exhortation to “move on from the reassuring repetition of stale phrases to a new, difficult, but essential confrontation with reality” (Miller Center of Public Affairs, 2011b). This includes the extent to which America still clings to some isolationist, nationalist ideologies despite a proclaimed espousal of globalization, together with the symbols that are used to reinforce those ideologies rather than simply engendering a legitimate sense of community and unity – flags and Pledges being examples.89 They also include an ethnocentric orientation to other cultures predicated only in part on a reductionist view of those cultures‟ identity, potentiated by the demonizing rhetoric of those who “lead‟ the country, which characterizes others based on their different political or religious orientations (or some other facet of identity) as “evil”. There is also the hope that this will lead to an awareness of the dissonance bound up in beliefs about freedom and democracy on the one hand, and US foreign policy and militarism, including coerced regime change (both covert and overt) in other sovereign states, in pursuit of maintaining its (meaning Americans‟) „interests‟ abroad.

### Debating EU Good

#### It has been THE alternative to NATO for decades – this is a core debate.

Kastrati 14 [Bilbil Kastrati is a Security Researcher of international security, 2014, “Similarities and Differences between NATO and the EU Enlargement,” https://www.readcube.com/articles/10.21113/iir.v4i2.45] Eric

After the end of the Cold War the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU) enlargement were two main political processes in the European continent. Both organizations since their inception, promoted the idea of integrated Europe without borders, which meant creating a Europe without divisions and bringing back all Central Eastern European (CEE) countries into the European family where they belong. However, after half a century of isolation in the totalitarian communist system the CEE countries (CEEC) had to undertake fundamental institutional, political, economic, military and other reforms in order to join NATO and the EU. In order to ease the process of accession, both organizations set certain criteria for membership for the CEECs. While NATO’s requirements for membership were more general and flexible, the EU’s requirements, on the other hand, were non-negotiable and closely enforced.

### AT: Covert CPs Bad

#### Lit base checks – covert policies are frequently used and are “controversial.”

Brunet-Jailly 05 [Emmanuel Brunet-Jailly is a Canadian politics and public policy scholar at the University of Victoria, British Columbia, Canada, where he is Associate Professor, co-director of the Local Government Institute, and director of the European Studies Program, 2005, http://dspace.library.uvic.ca/bitstream/handle/1828/781/uram\_2005.pdf] Eric

Covert action is a policy tool used by the United States government. It is secretive and highly controversial in that it attempts to actively change the course of events in other nations. Much covert action undertaken by the US government has taken place within the developing world - governments have been overthrown, elections influenced, media distorted, and the lives of millions of individuals affected by covert activities secretly organized and executed by US officials in Washington, DC and Langley, Virginia - headquarters of the Central Intelligence Agency

### AT: PICs Bad

#### Narrow focus good—engaging small parts of the plan spurs adaptation and innovation that solves their offense, it’s net better cause it creates in depth debates instead of stale disad and case—you should reward specificity, not punish it --- this is the best internal link to education

**Branson 2007** (Josh, NDT winner who became a policy analyst for major think-tanks, edebate, http://www.ndtceda.com/pipermail/edebate/2007-May/071122.html, 5/31)

B) How to make debate more like the technical policy world? Narrower debates. PICs are vital to this (sorry, Duck). Thinking back on my 8 years in debate, the topic about which I can best converse with experts about is the design of emissions trading schemes. That was because the literature was deep and the prevalence of upstream/downstream/auctioned/timetable PICs narrowed the debates and forced a real in-depth discussion. I just don’t think we get that in a ton of debates, because most PICs are either wanky rhetoric PICs (and yes I was an extreme culprit) or something even worse like Consultation. Thinking back on it, I don’t think that the legal topic was worded particularly poorly, I just think that our strategic norms of judging/debating create a lot of problems in generating the type of education a lot of us want. But one of the most striking thing for me about last year’s topic was that I learned more from Repko’s post about his day at the Supreme Court than I did from all the debates I judged combined. In any event, how to create the types of narrow debates that will general real sustainable expertise on topics is tough.

### AT: Negation Theory

#### Negation theory---if we win the counterplan is competitive then it’s worth considering---any other standard results in incomplete policy analysis---competition debates are good because they force strategic thinking and an in-depth understanding of cost-benefit analysis---outweighs any other value for debate

**Strait and Wallace ’7** [L. Paul, USC and Brett, George Mason U., The Scope of Negative Fiat and the Logic of Decision Making, Policy Cures? Health Assistance to Africa, Debaters Research Guide, p. A2]

More to the point, debate certainly helps teach a lot of skills, yet we believe that the way policy debate participation encourages you to think is the most valuable educational benefit, because how someone makes decisions determines how they will employ the rest of their abilities, including the research and communication skills that debate builds. Plenty of debate theory articles have explained either the value of debate, or the way in which alternate actor strategies are detrimental to real-world education, but none so far have attempted to tie these concepts together. We will now explain how decision-making skill development is the foremost value of policy debate and how this benefit is the decision-rule to resolving all theoretical discussions about negative fiat. Why debate? Some do it for scholarships, some do it for social purposes, and many just believe it is fun. These are certainly all relevant considerations when making the decision to join the debate team, but as debate theorists they aren’t the focus of our concern. Our concern is finding a framework for debate that educates the largest quantity of students with the highest quality of skills, while at the same time preserving competitive equity. The ability to make decisions deriving from discussions, argumentation or debate, is the key skill. It is the one thing every single one of us will do every day of our lives besides breathing. Decision-making transcends boundaries between categories of learning learning like “policy education” and “kritik education,” it makes irrelevant considerations of whether we will eventually be policymakers, and it transcends questions of what substantive content a debate round should contain. The implication for this analysis is that the critical thinking and argumentative skills offered by real-world decision-making are comparatively greater than any educational disadvantage weighed against them. It is the skills we learn, not the content of our arguments, that can best improve all of our lives. While policy comparison skills are going to be learned through debate in one way or another, those skills are useless if they are not grounded in the kind of logic actually used to make decisions.

**Any action could make the plan more likely.**

Jamie Wood 13, Avatel EVP, “The Butterfly Effect – What a Fascinating Theory!”, 6-10, https://avatel.wordpress.com/2013/06/10/the-butterfly-effect-what-a-fascinating-theory/

Every action or decision has some kind of effect on something or someone, if only in an indirect way. How we approach these decisions or actions we take can have a huge impact, not just on those directly involved, but on others we could hardly fathom would be affected. You never know what little action may be the tipping point for another action and or reaction. butterfly effect When you hear the words “The Butterfly Effect”, most of you will probably think of the movie. That was about the chaos theory, meaning one series of events leads to another and the effect of changing the course of those events. Actually the term “The Butterfly Effect”, was a phenomenon proposed in a doctoral thesis written in 1963 by Edward Lorenz. It states that a butterfly, by flapping its wings in one place and time is able to create a major weather event in another place and time, eventually having a far-reaching ripple effect on subsequent events. The butterfly effect suggests that cause and effect are applicable in the universe even if the pattern is indecipherable and the precise cause of our predicaments, rooted far away in time and space, are ultimately unfathomable. More than just an esoteric science, the chaos theory works off the concept that the relation between any two things is rarely linear in nature, that any reaction is usually the result of an accumulation of causative factors small and large, intentional and accidental.

### AT: Intl Fiat Bad

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### Neg---Condo Good

#### Heavy condo good—official US position

ÜLgen 21 — Ülgen is a visiting scholar at Carnegie Europe in Brussels, where his research focuses on Turkish foreign policy, nuclear policy, cyberpolicy, and transatlantic relations. Sinan ÜLgen, "Redefining the U.S.-Turkey Relationship," Carnegie Europe, 7-26-2021, https://carnegieeurope.eu/2021/07/26/redefining-u.s.-turkey-relationship-pub-85016, accessed 6-20-2022 WMK

This heavy conditionality has now become the official position of the United States in the Biden era. It is, however, a hugely challenging political condition for Erdoğan, who has relentlessly defended the S-400 decision at home. The question, now, is this: can Turkey and the United States find a mutually satisfactory compromise to overcome this strategic divide?

### Aff---Condo Bad

#### Conditionality is bad for policy making---it prevents spillup

Thanassis 21 — Cambanis Thanassis Cambanis is a senior fellow and director of Century International, The Century Foundation’s international research and policy center. Thanassis Cambanis, "No Strings Attached: Why Aid Conditionality Just Doesn’t Work," DAWN, 08-17-2021, https://dawnmena.org/no-strings-attached-why-aid-conditionality-just-doesnt-work/, accessed 7-3-2022 WMK

Intent is key to understanding how aid conditionality is supposed to work, and why it doesn't. The short answer is that the donor government—in this case, the United States—is not actually committed to any reform agenda that is nominally attached to its aid flows. In the Middle East, the U.S. goes to great lengths to overlook routine, endemic violations of the conditions attached to aid by U.S. law. Washington skirts or ignores outright those legal obligations, in the Foreign Assistance Act, the Arms Export Control Act and the so-called Leahy Laws. Even when the U.S. does withhold aid, it doesn't seem to change regime behavior.

Look no further than the Obama administration's frustrating response to the 2013 coup in Egypt, which the White House embarrassingly refused to call a coup. The U.S. government temporarily withheld some weapons transfers, which Abdel Fattah el-Sisi's regime claimed were a serious impediment to its domestic counterterrorism operations. But Egypt didn't make any concessions during the year and a half that it was deprived of American weapons to which it felt entitled. Sure enough, by the spring of 2015, U.S. military aid resumed—with no change in Egypt's behavior.

The longer answer about aid conditionality is that it would not compel recipient governments to change their policies, even if the U.S. pursued a reform agenda that integrated its diplomatic, military and aid strategies. The history of U.S. aid as a lever for reform is littered with failures. Long-term aid recipients like Egypt, Jordan, the Palestinian Authority and Lebanon have never once undertaken a reform requested by Washington in exchange for copious aid.